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Abstract 
Russia has ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption but has not successfully 
enforced  it.  This  paper  uses  updated  GTAP  data  to  reconstruct  a  computable 
general  equilibrium  (CGE)  model  to  quantify  the  macroeconomic  effects  of 
corruption in Russia. Corruption is found to cost the Russian economy billions of 
dollars a year. A conclusion of the paper is that implementing and enforcing the 
UNCAC would be of significant economic benefit to Russia and its people.
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1. Introduction 
The text of the U.N. Convention against Corruption was negotiated during seven 
sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of the Convention against 
Corruption, held between January 2002 and October 2003. This agreement was 
adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  by  resolution  58/4  in  October  2003.  The 
Convention needed 30 ratifications to come into force. In accordance with article 
68 (1) of the resolution, the United Nations Convention against Corruption entered 
into force on 14 December 2005. 
The Russian Federation signed the convention on December 9, 2003 and ratified it 
on May 6, 2006 (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008). In total, 140 countries have 
signed  the  convention,  and  116  have  ratified  it.  Russia  had  a  number  of 
reservations, but none seemed very significant:  
Table 1: Russian Federation Reservations to the UN Convention Against 
Corruption 
Reservation  Content  
1  The Russian Federation declares, in accordance with article 44, paragraph 6, 
subparagraph (a) of the Convention, that it will take the Convention as the 
legal  basis  for  cooperation  on  extradition  with  other  States  Parties  to  the 
Convention, on a foundation of reciprocity. 
2  The Russian Federation declares, on the basis of the last sentence of article 46, 
paragraph 13, of the Convention, that it will, on a foundation of reciprocity and 
in  urgent  circumstances,  accept  requests  for  mutual  legal  assistance  and 
communications  through  the  International  Criminal  Police  Organization, 
provided that the documents containing such requests and communications 
are dispatched without delay in the prescribed manner. 
3  The Russian Federation declares, in accordance with article 46, paragraph 14, 
of  the  Convention,  that  requests  for  mutual  legal  assistance  and 
communications related thereto addressed to the Russian Federation must be 
accompanied by translations into Russian, unless otherwise established by an 
international  agreement  of  the  Russian  Federation  or  unless  otherwise 
arranged  between  the  central  authority  of  the  Russian  Federation  and  the 
central authority of the other State Party to the Convention. 
Source: United Nations 
Given these insignificant reservations, it would appear the Russian Federation was 
has  signed  on  whole-heartedly  to  the  convention.  (See  Table  1).  Given  the 
transition  history  of  the  former  Soviet  Union,  Russia  committed  itself  to  major 
improvements in its regulation of corruption. According to the Preamble to the 
Convention, the purposes of the convention are: (a) to promote and strengthen 
measures to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively; (b) to 
promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and technical assistance 
in the prevention of and fight against corruption, including in asset recovery; (c) to 
promote  integrity,  accountability  and  proper  management  of  public  affairs  and 
public property (UN Convention Against Corruption, Chapter I, Article 1). Why Enforcing its UNCAC Commitments Would be Good for Russia A CGE Model 
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Table  2:  UN  Convention  Against  Corruption:  Article  5  Provisions 
Promoting Prevention 
Provision  Content 
1  Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal 
system,  develop  and  implement  or  maintain  effective,  coordinated 
anticorruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the 
principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public 
property, integrity, transparency and accountability. 
2  Each  State  Party  shall  endeavor  to  establish  and  promote  effective  practices 
aimed at the prevention of corruption. 
3  Each  State  Party  shall  endeavor  to  periodically  evaluate  relevant  legal 
instruments  and  administrative  measures  with  a  view  to  determining  their 
adequacy to prevent and fight corruption. 
4  States  Parties  shall,  as  appropriate  and  in  accordance  with  the  fundamental 
principles of their legal system, collaborate with each other and with relevant 
international  and  regional  organizations  in  promoting  and  developing  the 
measures referred to in this article. That collaboration may include participation 
in international programs and projects aimed at the prevention of corruption. 
Source: Article 5 of UN Convention Against Corruption 
According to the UN, the major highlights of the convention include an emphasis 
on (a) prevention, (b) criminalization, (c) international cooperation, and (d) asset 
recovery. Article 5 of the Convention enjoins  each State Party to  establish and 
promote  effective  practices  aimed  at  the  prevention  of  corruption.  Significant 
provisions of Article 5 are presented in Table 2. 
Russia  has  also  committed  itself  to  criminalizing  corruption.  The  Convention 
requires countries to establish criminal and other offences to cover a wide range of 
acts of corruption, if these are not already crimes under domestic law. In some 
cases, States are legally obliged to establish offences; in other cases, in order to 
take into account differences in domestic law, they are required to consider doing 
so. According to the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, the Convention goes beyond 
previous instruments of this kind, criminalizing not only basic forms of corruption 
such as bribery and the embezzlement of public funds, but also trading in influence 
and the concealment and laundering of the proceeds of corruption (UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime, 2008). Several provisions are aimed at criminalizing bribery or 
unjust enrichment of individuals. Table 3 presents selected provisions. 
The UN Convention also  commits Russia to cooperate  with other signatories in 
every aspect of the fight against corruption, including prevention, investigation, 
and  the  prosecution  of  offenders.  Countries  are  “bound  by  the  Convention  to 
render  specific  forms  of  mutual  legal  assistance  in  gathering  and  transferring 
evidence for use in court, to extradite offenders. Countries are also required to 
undertake  measures  which  will  support  the  tracing,  freezing,  seizure  and 
confiscation of the proceeds of corruption.” (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008) Michael P. BARRY  
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Finally, Russia’s ratification of the convention commits it to significant provisions on 
asset-recovery. Article 51 provides for the return of assets to countries of origin as 
a  fundamental  principle  of  this  Convention  (UN  Convention  Against  Corruption, 
Chapter V, Article 51). Article 43 obliges state parties to extend the widest possible 
cooperation to each other in the investigation and prosecution of offences defined 
in the Convention (UN Convention Against Corruption, Chapter IV, Article 43). 
Table 3: Selected Criminalization Provisions of the UN Convention Against 
Corruption 
Article  Provision 
Article 
15 
Bribery of national public officials 
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary 
to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: 
(a) The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an 
undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in 
order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official 
duties; 
(b)  The  solicitation  or  acceptance  by  a  public  official,  directly  or  indirectly,  of  an 
undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in 
order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official 
duties. 
Article 
17 
Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official 
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary 
to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally, the embezzlement, 
misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or for the 
benefit  of  another  person  or  entity,  of  any  property,  public  or  private  funds  or 
securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the public official by virtue of his or 
her position. 
Article 
20 
Illicit enrichment 
Subject to its constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each 
State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary  to  establish  as  a  criminal  offence,  when  committed  intentionally,  illicit 
enrichment, that is, a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or 
she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income. 
Article 
21 
Bribery in the private sector 
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may 
be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally in the 
course of economic, financial or commercial activities: 
(a) The promise, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage to 
any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the 
person himself or herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of 
his or her duties, act or refrain from acting; 
(b) The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage by any 
person  who  directs  or  works,  in  any  capacity,  for  a  private  sector  entity,  for  the 
person himself or herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of 
his or her duties, act or refrain from acting. 
Source: UN Convention Against Corruption Why Enforcing its UNCAC Commitments Would be Good for Russia A CGE Model 
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2. Russia’s Record on Corruption 
Russia has ratified the UNCAC, but enforcement is a different matter. As suggested 
by Robert Orttung, in September 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared 
that an inability to make much progress in the battle against corruption was one of 
his administration’s greatest failures. In fact, rising corruption has been a direct 
consequence of Putin’s policies to strengthen the state and to crack down on many 
elements of Russia’s civil society (Orttung, 2006). Several organizations seem to 
agree  that  corruption  in  Russia  decreased  in  the  early  years  of  Putin’s 
administration,  but  has  increased  again  in  the  last  couple  years.  These 
organizations include Transparency International, the World Bank, and Freedom 
House. While the overall number of bribes may be shrinking, the size of the bribes 
is growing (Orttung, 2006). 
One study of corruption in the Russian Federation questioned 1,502 people on 
their views of corruption. Forty-three percent of respondents said that corruption 
didn’t affect their families’ lives and 29% said that it “affected it to a small degree.” 
But 36% of the respondents held that there was a “medium” degree of influence of 
corruption in the business environment, and 32% described it as “strong.” More 
than a half the respondents (54%) said that corruption influences Russian political 
life “very strongly.” (Panfilova , 2006). 
A  Gallup  Poll  from  Russia  suggests  the  problem  is  even  more  widespread.  In 
answering the question, "Is corruption widespread throughout the government in 
your country?" 80% of respondents gave an affirmative reply. Similarly, 79% replied 
affirmatively to the question, "Is corruption widespread within businesses located 
in your country?" (Gradirovski and Esipova, 2006). Only seven percent of Russians 
say they are satisfied with efforts to control crime and corruption in the country. In 
comparison, more than three times as high a percentage (23%) claim satisfaction in 
Italy, Turkey, and Mexico (Gradirovski and Esipova, 2006). The percentages in the 
United States (47%), Canada (47%), and France (50%) who say they are satisfied 
with control of crime and corruption are about seven times as high as that in Russia 
(Gradirovski and Esipova, 2006). 
Georgiy  Satarov,  the  president  of  the  INDEM  Fund  and  a  leading  expert  on 
corruption  in  Russia,  argues  that  the  country  is  seeing  the  most  voluminous 
blossoming of bribery in its entire history. The total sum of bribes annually meted 
out  by  Russians  has  reached  $30  billion,  Satarov  claims,  with  the  market  of 
"everyday corruption" in which ordinary consumers pay bribes -- for example, in 
the public health services, in the education system, on the roads, in institutions of Michael P. BARRY  
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higher  learning,  in  Housing  Management  Agencies,  and  in  child  care  centers  -- 
comprising about $3 billion of that.
1 
Transparency  International  placed  Russia  at  121  out  of  163  countries  in  its 
Corruption Perceptions Index for 2006. Moscow has been placed 28th out of 30 in 
the 2005 rating of which cities are desirable places in which to do business (Novye 
izvestia, 2005). But in 2005, A.T. Kearney placed Russia in sixth place in its rating of 
attractiveness for investors. Russia’s country risk ranking, according to Euromoney 
in March 2005, moved up to 61 out of 185 countries surveyed, while Institutional 
Investor  for  the  same  month  placed  Russia  at  58  out  of  173  countries  (BOFIT 
Weekly, April 15 2005). In its 2006 corporate governance ratings, the World Bank 
placed Russia at 151 out of 208 countries, behind Zambia, Uganda, and Swaziland, 
(Moscow Times, September 18 2006) while its Doing Business survey put Russia at 
96 out of 175 countries (BOFIT Weekly, September 15 2005). In the Transparency 
International’s  Bribe  Payers  Index  for  2006,  Russia  was  placed  28th  out  of  30 
countries (Moscow Times, October 5 2006). And in the 2007 International Property 
Rights ranking, Russia came in at 63rd out of 70 countries (Moscow Times, 2007). 
In  conclusion,  while  Russia  has  signed  and  ratified  the  UN  Convention  Against 
Corruption,  survey  and  other  data  suggest  that  Russia  has  yet  to  enforce  the 
provisions of that convention. The question for this paper is this: how much does a 
failure  to  enforce  the  UNCAC  cost  Russia?  Answering  this  question  will  require 
some assumptions and the use of a large mathematical model. 
3. CGE Model for Corruption in Russia 
This section will develop a computable general equilibrium model to quantify the 
macroeconomic effects of corruption in Russia and on its trading partners. The 
section is broken into several parts, including, (a) a background of CGE models; (b) 
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP); (c) the structure of this paper’s model, (d) 
model results; (e) model limitations and future research. 
3.1. Background of General Equilibrium Models 
General equilibrium, a concept which dates back to Leon Walras (1834-1910), is a 
pillar of modern economic thought. General equilibrium recognizes that there are 
many markets in an economy, and that these markets all interact in complex ways 
with each other. In rough terms, everything depends on everything else. Demand 
for any one good depends on the prices of all other goods and on income. Income, 
in turn, depends on wages, profits, and rents, which depend on technology, factor 
supplies  and  production,  the  last  of  which,  in  its  turn,  depends  on  sales  (i.e., 
demand). Prices depend on wages and profits and vice versa (Hertel, et al., 2007). 
                                                           
1  See  Information  Science  for  Democracy  (INDEM),  Diagnostics  of  Corruption  in  Russia  2001-2005. 
Available at website http://www.indem.ru/en/index.shtml. Why Enforcing its UNCAC Commitments Would be Good for Russia A CGE Model 
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Computable  General  Equilibrium  (CGE)  modeling  specifies  all  economic 
relationships in mathematical terms and puts them together in a form that allows 
the model to predict the change in variables such as prices, output and economic 
welfare  resulting  from  a  change  in  economic  policies.  To  do  this,  the  model 
requires information about technology (the inputs required to produce a unit of 
output),  policies  and  consumer  preferences.  The  key  of  the  model  is  “market 
clearing,” the condition that says supply should equal demand in every market. The 
solution, or “equilibrium,” is that set of prices  where  supply equals demand in 
every market— goods, factors, foreign exchange, and everything else (Hertel, et al., 
2007). 
As presented in Figure 1, a  CGE model is a closed  system. This means that no 
production or financial flow escapes the system and none are created outside of 
the  system.  In  basic  closure  terms,  we  assume  output  will  equal  income. 
Households, businesses, the government, and the financial sector, and the foreign 
sector are all connected by real flows and financial flows. Intuitively, the idea of a 
“general” equilibrium is captured; any given market is connected to all of the other 
markets for the system. 
 
Figure 1: Factor Payments 
Source: Created by the author 
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Over the last 25 years, CGE models have become an important tool for analyzing 
economic  issues,  including  trade  policy,  taxation  policy,  technological  growth, 
energy  policy,  environmental  issues,  and  even  warfare.  This  development  is 
explained  by  the  ability  of  CGE  models  to  provide  an  elaborate  and  realistic 
representation of the economy including the linkages between all agents, sectors 
and other economies. While this complete coverage permits a unique insight into 
the  effects  of  changes  in  the  economic  environment  throughout  the  whole 
economy, single country, and especially global CGE models very often include an 
enormous number of variables, parameters and equations (Brockmier, 2001).  
CGE modeling is a very powerful tool, allowing economists to explore numerically a 
huge range of issues on which econometric estimation would be impossible; in 
particular to forecast the effects of future policy changes. The models have their 
limitations, however. First, CGE simulations are not unconditional predictions but 
rather  ‘thought  experiments’  about  what  the  world  would  be  like  if  the  policy 
change had been operative in the assumed circumstances and year. The real world 
will doubtless have changed by the time we get there. Second, while CGE models 
are quantitative, they are not empirical in the sense of econometric modeling: they 
are  basically  theoretical,  with  limited  possibilities  for  rigorous  testing  against 
experience. Third, conclusions about trade and other policies are very sensitive to 
data assumption. One can readily do sensitivity analysis on the parameter values 
assumed for economic behavior, although less so on the data, because altering one 
element of the base data requires compensating changes elsewhere in order to 
keep  the  national  accounts  and  social  accounting  matrix  in  balance.  Of  course, 
many of these criticisms apply to other types of economic modeling, and therefore, 
while imperfect, CGE models remain the preferred tool for analysis of many global 
issues. 
3.2. The Global Trade Analysis Project 
One of the most widely-used CGE models is the GTAP Model. The Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP), with headquarters at Purdue University, has organized a 
consortium  of  national  and  international  agencies  which  provide  guidance  and 
base-level support for the Project (GTAP, 2008). 
GTAP is a multi-regional CGE model which captures world economic activity in 57 
different industries of 66 regions. The underlying equation system of GTAP includes 
two  different  kinds  of  equations.  One  part  covers  the  accounting  relationships 
which ensure that receipts and expenditures of every agent in the economy are 
balanced. The other part of the equation system consists of behavioral equations 
which based upon microeconomic theory. These equations specify the behavior of 
optimizing agents in the economy, such as demand functions (Brockmier, 2001). 
Input-out tables summarize the linkages between all industries and agents. 
The mathematical relationships assumed in the GTAP model are simplified, though 
they  adhere  to  the  principle  of  “many  markets.”  The  simplification  is  that Why Enforcing its UNCAC Commitments Would be Good for Russia A CGE Model 
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thousands of markets are “aggregated” into groups. For example, ‘transport and 
communications  services’  appear  as  a  single  industry.  In  principle  all  the 
relationships in a model could be estimated from detailed data on the economy 
over  many  years.  In  practice,  however,  their  number  and  parameterization 
generally outweigh the data available. In the GTAP model, only the most important 
relationships have been econometrically estimated. These include the international 
trade elasticities and the agricultural factor supply and demand elasticities. The 
remaining economic relationships are based on literature reviews. 
3.3. Structure of this Paper’s Model 
The  model employed in this paper is that of the  GTAP  project. While the  core 
database has 57 sectors and 66 regions, I have aggregated the matrices to simplify 
the world into just eight sectors, eight regions, and five factors of production. This 
aggregation is described in Table 4. 
The  data  is  first,  “calibrated,”  meaning  the  model  is  solved  for  its  original 
equilibrium prices and volumes in all markets. This baseline is meant to represent 
the  economy  as  is,  before  any  shock  takes  place.  Thousands  of  equations  are 
created, each representing supply and demand conditions in markets inside each 
region,  including  markets  for  goods,  services,  factors  of  production,  savings, 
government expenditure, and more. Equations are also generated for trade of all 
goods  between  each  of  the  regions,  separately  created  for  each  industry.  The 
calibrated result is a large set of simultaneous equations, of which the solution 
matches the existing prices and quantity levels of the economy. 
Table 4: Aggregation used in the Model 
Regions  Sectors  Factors 
Russia  Oil and Gas  Land 
Rest of Former USSR  Electricity  Unskilled Labor 
United States  Metals and Minerals  Skilled Labor 
European Union  Food Crops  Capital 
China  Meat and Animals  Natural Resources 
SE Asia  Forest and Fisheries   
South America  Manufacturing   
Rest of the World  Services   
Source: Generated by Author 
A “shock” is then introduced to system. Mathematically, a “shock” is the alteration 
of a single parameter or variable in the giant system. That change acts like a stone 
thrown in a pond, with waves created throughout every one of the thousands of 
equations in the system. The model is re-solved with the one autonomous change, 
and the effects on the system are then measured. Michael P. BARRY  
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The “shock” in this model is the introduction of a tax on business, an income tax. In 
this sense, corruption is modeled as a cost of doing business (or participating in the 
economy). The revenues of this tax are not accrued to the government, but to 
other individuals in the economy. From a businessperson’s perspective, paying for 
corruption is just another cost of doing business, like a tax. 
Theoretically,  any  tax  on  markets  is  thought  to  distort  economic  decisions  and 
interfere with efficiency. From the producers’ side, a tax changes relative incomes. 
Producers  change  the  amount  of  production,  the  type  of  production,  and  the 
method  of  production  (inputs).  On  the  consumers’  side,  the  tax  changes  the 
relative prices of goods. Income and substitution effects push the consumer to 
change the amount of his or her consumption and the choice of which goods to 
consumer. Together these changes in production and consumption are thought to 
result in an efficiency loss. More inputs are used to produce the same outputs, and 
the economy consumes a different mix of goods.
2 
3.4. Model Results 
The experiment in this model is a 5 percent “corruption tax,” applied to all sectors 
in the Russian economy. The pre-shock tax rates of each sector are presented in 
the first column of Table 5. The “corruption tax” is added to each sector, resulting 
in the second column of numbers. The goal of the GGE model will be to trade the 
ripple effects of these tax increases through the entire Russian economy.  
Table 5: Russian Output tax by Sector (Percent) 
RTO   Initial rTO  With Shock rTO 
1 Land  6.8  11.8 
2 UnSkLab  21.5  26.5 
3 SkLab  21.5  26.5 
4 Capital  6.8  11.8 
5 NatRes  6.8  11.8 
6 OilGas  18.7  23.7 
7 Electricity  2.8  7.8 
8 MetalsMin  3.3  8.3 
9 FoodCrops  1.5  6.5 
10 MeatAnimals  -0.5  4.5 
11 ForestFish  2.9  7.9 
12 Mnfcs  2.5  7.5 
13 Svces  2.6  7.6 
14 CGDS  0  5 
Source: Generated by Author 
                                                           
2  For  more  on  economic  efficiency  and  taxation,  see  McConnell,  Campbell  R.  and  Brue,  Stanley  L., 
Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies, 16th Ed., McGraw Hill Publishing, 2006. Why Enforcing its UNCAC Commitments Would be Good for Russia A CGE Model 
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Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a measure of the final value of all production of 
goods and services within the borders of the Russian Federation. As shown in Table 
6, according to the model, the taxing effect of corruption results in a $1.98 billion 
decrease in Russian GDP. In other words, assuming a modest 5 percent burden on 
Russian business, corruption in Russia is costing the economy nearly $2 billion each 
year. 
Table 6: Change in Russian GDP (Millions of Dollars) 
Qgdp  (Sim)  Pre  Post  Change 
Russia  -0.64  309,948  307,963  -1,984.9 
RestofUSSR  -0.03  104,328  104,296  -32.6 
USA  0  10,082,155  10,082,199  44.0 
EU  0.01  7,929,525  7,930,110  585.0 
China  0  1,321,825  1,321,828  3.5 
SEAsia  0  5,531,997  5,532,130  133.5 
SAmerica  0.01  1,345,630  1,345,704  74.0 
ROW  0.01  4,653,195  4,653,461  266.0 
Source: Generated by Author 
While GDP measures the amount of production in the Russian economy, a slightly 
different question is what effect corruption has on consumer welfare—the utility 
consumers in Russia enjoy from consuming goods. As shown in Table 7, according 
to the model, corruption causes a $2.4 billion decrease in consumer welfare. This 
measure is made up of three parts. First is the allocative efficiency loss of $2.98 
billion. This loss is  equivalent to the decrease in GDP, and represents a loss in 
efficiency—that the same inputs produce less output in the presence of corruption. 
The second element to welfare loss is the $3.6 billion loss in Russian terms of trade. 
A  terms  of  trade  loss  represents  a  drop  in  global  competitiveness  caused  by 
corruption. A country exports goods in order to earn foreign exchange needed to 
purchase imports. With corruption, Russia will receive fewer imports in exchange 
for its exports. 
These  welfare  losses  are  partially  offset  by  a  gain  in  savings  and  investment 
efficiency. While corruption and rent seeking is a distorting cost of doing business, 
there  are  individuals  who  are  the  recipients  of  the  bribes  and  payoffs.  These 
individuals have a source of extra funds now—available for savings, investment, or 
more consumption. This welfare gain, however, is not enough to make up for the 
loss  in  allocative  efficiency  and  terms  of  trade.  The  total  effect  of  corruption, 
according the model, remains a negative $2.4 billion. 
These losses can be traced to individual sectors of the Russian economy. As shown 
in Table 8, the corruption tax causes both a decrease in total output, as well as a 
significant  shift  of  resources  from  some  sectors  to  others.  Output  increases  in 
several  sectors,  including  oil  and  gas  (3.5  percent),  metals  and  minerals  (9.3 Michael P. BARRY  
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percent), food crops (4.0 percent), and forest and fisheries (4.3 percent). But this is 
at the expense of other sectors in which production decreases, including electricity 
production (-0.1 percent), manufacturing (-0.3 percent), and the service industry (-
2.7 percent).  
Table 7: Welfare Effects (Millions of Dollars) 
WELFARE 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
Endow
ments Technology  Population 
Terms of 
Trade 
Savings and 
Investment  Total 
1 Russia  -1,984.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  -3,570.6  3,165.5  -2,389.9 
2RestofUSSR  -32.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  68.6  -8.2  27.8 
3 USA  44.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  1,524.5  -100.3  1,468.6 
4 EU  584.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  1,793.6  -759.3  1,619.0 
5 China  3.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  345.6  -529.5  -180.5 
6 SEAsia  133.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  1,642.0  -1,116.7  658.9 
7 SAmerica  74.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -70.2  -91.5  -87.7 
8 ROW  266.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -1,733.4  -559.9  -2,027.3 
Total  -911.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -911.1 
Source: Generated by Author 
Possibly the most worrying output result, however, is the 39.8 percent drop in the 
output of capital goods. While the GTAP model is not well equipped to analyze 
dynamic changes in investment and future incomes, this decrease in capital good 
production is significant. Capital goods are expenditures by businesses to increase 
their future production capacity: factories, research and development, equipment, 
infrastructure. A decrease in this output represents both a current drop in output 
and, probably more importantly, a drop in future output potential. Even without 
corruption, the Russian Federation would be suffering from extremely low levels of 
business  investment.  That  corruption  would  so  strongly  impact  what  little 
investment already takes place is striking. Corruption is hurting the present and the 
future of Russia. 
Table 8: Change in Output, by sector (Percent) 
Qo  Russia 
Restof 
USSR  USA  EU  China  SEAsia  SAmerica  ROW 
OilGas  3.5  -0.72  -0.57  -0.66  -0.52  -0.63  -0.6  -0.63 
Electricity  -0.14  0.14  -0.02  0  -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  0.03 
MetalsMin  9.31  0.01  -0.16  -0.17  -0.09  -0.25  -0.16  -0.15 
FoodCrops  4.09  -0.21  -0.04  -0.05  -0.01  -0.05  -0.08  -0.05 
MeatAnimals  1.83  -0.1  -0.05  -0.1  0.01  -0.02  -0.06  -0.03 
ForestFish  4.31  -0.04  -0.08  -0.09  -0.08  -0.11  -0.03  -0.02 
Mnfcs  -0.26  -0.04  -0.04  0  0.01  -0.08  0.16  0.29 
Svces  -2.73  0.13  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.02  -0.01 
CGDS  -39.8  0.74  0.31  0.38  0.2  0.38  0.38  0.36 
Source: Generated by Author Why Enforcing its UNCAC Commitments Would be Good for Russia A CGE Model 
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The  significant  drop  in  production  of  capital  goods  is  caused  by  a  significant 
decrease in returns on business investment. As shown in Table 9, the rate of return 
on capital in Russia decreases by 25.5 percent.
3 Businesses and individuals in Russia 
see  a  much  weaker  incentive  to  take  risks  on  innovation,  invention, 
entrepreneurship, and investment. Apparently, a corruption tax disproportionately 
falls on capital good output. Again, this is a serious drag on economic growth for 
the Russian Federation. 
Table 9: Rate of Return on Capital (Percent Change) 
Rorc  (Sim) 
Russia  -25.47 
RestofUSSR  0.35 
USA  0.06 
EU  0.06 
China  0.06 
SEAsia  0.07 
SAmerica  0.07 
ROW  0.07 
Source: Generated by Author 
These  results  are  consistent  with  economic  literature.  According  to  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), corruption may reduce investment by adding 
to its cost and by acting as a tax on its returns, and by adding to uncertainty. 
According to John Roaf of the IMF, high levels of corruption are likely to have been 
an especially important factor behind Russia’s extremely low level of foreign direct 
investment, for several reasons: (i) the relatively large size of foreign investments, 
and the special regulations applying to them, are particularly conducive to rent-
seeking; (ii) local companies may use corruption to shut foreign competitors out; 
and (iii) foreigners lack specific knowledge of how to operate in a particular corrupt 
environment (Roaf, 2000). 
From  a  Russian  consumer’s  perspective,  corruption  leads  results  in  decreased 
consumption.  As  shown  in  Table  10,  according  to  the  CGE  model,  a  5  percent 
“corruption tax” results in a 7.2 percent decrease in Russian private consumption. 
Corruption  leads  to  lower  personal  income,  and  thus  less  consumption.  It  also 
changes relative prices, producing substitution effects as consumers try to change 
their consumption away from more expensive goods and towards cheaper ones. 
 
                                                           
3 This does not represent a 25.5 percentage point drop in the interest rate or yield on investment. 
Rather, it represents a 25.5 percent decrease in the yield itself. For example, if the rate of return had 
been 10 percent, a 25 percent drop would leave the rate of return at 7.5 percent. Either way, the 
decrease is still very large. Michael P. BARRY  
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Table 10: Private Consumption (Percent Change) 
Yp  (Sim) 
Russia  -7.15 
RestofUSSR  -0.35 
USA  0.19 
EU  0.14 
China  0.13 
SEAsia  0.21 
SAmerica  0.13 
ROW  0.06 
Source: Generated by Author 
In addition to internal economic impacts, corruption appears to significantly affect 
Russia’s trade with other countries of the world. As shown in Table 11, according to 
the CGE model, this 5 percent “corruption tax” actually results in a $22.2 billion 
increase in Russia’s trade balance. This would not be inconsistent with the large 
terms of trade loss Russia experiences. Given Russia’s terms of trade, it would now 
take more Russian exports to finance the same number of imports. This would 
explain an increase in net exports. While Russia’s net exports increase, the trade 
balances of its trading partners decrease, including those of the United States (-6.4 
billion), the European Union (-$5.8 billion), South and East Asia (-$4.6 billion), South 
America (-$1.0 billion), and the rest of the world (-$3.6 billion).  
Table 11: Change in Trade Balances (Millions of Dollars) 
DTBAL  (Sim) 
Russia  22,224.9 
RestofUSSR  -168.0 
USA  -6,388.6 
EU  -5,830.2 
China  -726.4 
SEAsia  -4,572.2 
SAmerica  -968.5 
ROW  -3,571.0 
Source: Generated by Author 
The change in trade balances can be broken down by sector, as presented in Table 
12. For Russia, it sees an improved trade balance in every single sector except 
electricity. Russian  services  experience the greatest trade balance improvement 
($7.1 billion), mostly at the expense of services in the EU (-$2.6 billion), the United 
States(-$1.7 billion), and South and East Asia (-$1.2 billion). Similarly, Russia’s trade 
balance in manufactured goods improves by $6.9 billion, mostly at the expense of 
the  U.S.  manufacturing  trade  balance  (-$4.0  billion)  and  that  of  the  EU  (-$1.8 
billion). Other major shifts occur in the trade balances of oil and gas, and that in 
metals and minerals. Why Enforcing its UNCAC Commitments Would be Good for Russia A CGE Model 
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Table 12: Change in Trade Balances by Sector (Millions of Dollars) 
DTBALi  Russia 
Restof 
USSR  USA  EU  China  SEAsia  SAmerica  ROW 
OilGas  2513.74  -27.28  560.3  733.17  -23.77  489.11  -430.79  -3843.45 
Electricity  -61.03  45.61  -9.54  3.21  -0.3  -0.41  -3.61  26.07 
MetalsMin  3839.22  23.32  -753.25  -1100.17  -253.82  -790.49  -177.43  -810.39 
FoodCrops  1685.77  -167.49  -315.66  -376.29  -56.63  -316.55  -156.49  -231.74 
MeatAnimals  96.7  -11.93  -8.32  -36.72  -12.36  -9.87  -1.35  -17.1 
ForestFish  180.51  -0.4  -13.62  -40.24  -24.77  -33.7  -2.2  -60.45 
Mnfcs  6864.89  -136.57  -4048.72  -2459.41  -114.6  -2669.8  79.98  2380.14 
Svces  7105.06  106.72  -1799.79  -2553.7  -240.16  -1240.46  -276.65  -1014.06 
Source: Generated by Author 
Exports and imports are examined individually in Table 13 and Table 14. In general, 
Russian exports increase in every sector and Russian imports decrease in every 
sector, except in the electricity sector. Sectors with the highest percent increase of 
exports in Russia include services (25.8 percent), meat and animals (23.6 percent), 
food crops (17.8 percent), and metals and minerals (15.0 percent). Sectors with the 
largest percent decrease in Russian imports include services (-23.1 percent), meat 
and animals (-22.1 percent), manufacturers (-10.8 percent), and forest and fisheries 
(-7.4 percent). 
Table 13: Value of Exports by Sector (Percent Change) 
Vxwfob 
Russia 
Restof 
USSR 
USA  EU  China  SEAsia  SAmerica  ROW 
OilGas  6.63  -2.04  -4.91  -2.12  -4.31  -2.48  -2.64  -1.93 
Electricity  -7.24  2.43  -0.44  0.11  0.08  -0.01  -0.01  0.28 
MetalsMin  14.95  0.75  -0.74  -0.36  -0.32  -0.62  -0.37  -0.27 
FoodCrops  17.75  -2.83  -0.3  -0.09  -0.1  -0.16  -0.24  -0.1 
MeatAnimals  23.63  -3.47  -0.11  -0.37  -0.31  -0.13  -0.1  -0.12 
ForestFish  10.51  0  -0.75  -0.61  -0.79  -0.85  -0.3  -0.81 
Mnfcs  9.53  -1.39  -0.2  0  0.09  -0.13  0.36  0.47 
Svces  25.81  0.53  -0.51  -0.26  -0.12  -0.32  -0.39  -0.25 
Source: Generated by Author 
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Table 14: Value of Iports by Sector (Percent Change) 
Viwcif 
Russia 
Restof 
USSR 
USA  EU  China  SEAsia  SAmerica  ROW 
OilGas  -6.3  -1.18  -0.8  -1.14  -0.1  -1.15  -1.03  0.21 
Electricity  4.65  -1.23  0.39  0.06  0.14  0.25  0.15  0.01 
MetalsMin  -5.38  1.37  0.43  0.14  0.42  0.32  0.25  0.29 
FoodCrops  -9.6  0.74  0.3  0.12  0.23  0.31  0.14  0.12 
MeatAnimals  -22.12  2.87  0.32  0.23  0.22  0.25  0.17  0.3 
ForestFish  -7.41  1.59  0.14  0.17  0.85  0.25  0.17  0.38 
Mnfcs  -10.8  -0.34  0.32  0.17  0.15  0.22  0.15  0.12 
Svces  -23.13  -0.66  0.34  0.19  0.18  0.34  0.26  0.16 
Source: Generated by Author 
3.5. Model Limitations and Future Research 
This experiment raises several methodological questions. First, the magnitude and 
character of corruption costs to businesses are worth exploring. While this model 
imposes an empirically-supported “corruption tax” on businesses (as provided from 
survey data), that 5 percent tax on business is assumed to be the same across 
sectors. It would be reasonable to assume corruption is stronger in some sectors 
and weaker in others, so a better experiment would be one which allowed for 
these sectoral differences. 
Second, this model is a static model. It does not capture the changes in capital 
infrastructure  and  production  capacity  over  time.  While  the  current  effect  on 
capital goods output is apparent, the long-term effect of that drop in production 
capacity is not modeled here. It would surely increase the final cost of corruption to 
society, as measured by a model. 
Finally, while this experiment quantifies economic impacts of corruption, the causal 
relationship  between  anti-corruption  laws  and  lower  corruption  remains  an 
assumption of the model. A conclusion of the paper is that Russia should increase 
its laws and regulations in the battle against corruption, but exactly how much that 
campaign would change the numbers in this study is not clear.      
4. Policy Implications 
The main conclusion of this quantitative analysis is that Russians themselves would 
significantly benefit from closer compliance with its commitments to the UN under 
the Convention Against Corruption. While all of the provisions likely have benefits, 
this CGE Model would emphasize the economic benefits of enforcing the general 
Article 5 Provisions on Prevention and provisions of Articles 15, 17, 20, and 21 
against bribery in the public and private sector, unjust enrichment and payments, 
and  embezzlement  of  property.  These  provisions  in  particular  focus  on  how 
corruption can serve as a major tax on business. As with any tax, this “corruption Why Enforcing its UNCAC Commitments Would be Good for Russia A CGE Model 
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tax” distorts markets and causes change in producer and consumer behavior. The 
net result is a welfare loss to the Russia economy. 
According to Robert Ortung of the CSIS, four components would define an effective 
anti-corruption policy in Russia (Orttung, 2006).
 The first would be to reduce and 
reform the current bureaucracy (Orttung, 2006). The second would be to allow 
society to hold its government accountable through mechanisms such as a free 
press, an active and independent civil society, and competitive elections (Orttung, 
2006). A third feature of an anti-corruption policy would be the decentralization of 
power from the federal level to regional and local levels, providing for a system of 
checks  and  balances  between  the  three  levels  of  government  (Orttung,  2006). 
Finally, Russia should try to address inequality between Moscow and St. Petersburg 
and the rest of the country (Orttung, 2006).
  
On the same lines, economists from the IMF suggest measures which would reduce 
opportunities for corruption by eliminating discretionary elements of government 
policy.  In  particular,  a  more  transparent  and  well-administered  tax-collection 
system  would  reduce  bribery  and  official  corruption  (Roaf,  2000).
  Equally 
important, is government regulation and licensing of economic activity. According 
to the IMF, the average new business applicant must deal with 20-30 registration 
and licensing agencies. Simply cataloguing all the regulations applying to business 
would be useful in helping expose which regulations are economically justifiable 
and which exist mainly to extort rents (Roaf, 2000). 
The list of suggestions go on and on, and the problems of corruption seems well 
appreciated. The contribution of this paper has been to quantify the impact of 
these problems. And in a general way, it emphasized the importance of adhering to 
a philosophy that corruption is detrimental to an economy. Whether it is the UN 
Convention Against Corruption, an agreement with the OECD, an internal campaign 
to reduce corruption, or a change in the behavior of Russian citizens themselves, 
the message is clear. Corruption comes at a cost. Russia should comply with the 
UNCAC. 
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